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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4)(f). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Defendants' failure to comply with Rule 11(e)(2) Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, and failure to marshal evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict preclude their complaints about the trial court's denial of post-trial motions 
and about various evidentiary rulings? If not, have Defendants failed to show that 
any evidentiary errors were anything but harmless? 
Standard of Review: An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
jury's findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trail court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making 
them "clearly erroneous." Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^[15, 979 P.2d 338. Appellants' 
failure to marshal the evidence requires this Court to assume that all jury findings are 
supported by the evidence. Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy. 958 P.2d 228, 233 
(Utah 1998). Even if this Court were to consider these fact issues, they are reviewed for 
whether any errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence were so substantial and 
prejudicial that appellants were deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration 
of the disputed issues by the jury. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), 
Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Was the trial court correct in following undisturbed Utah precedents 
holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor was not available to Defendants as a 
defense to breach of warranty claims when the home they sold was unfinished, 
1 
new, and when the Defendants breached ongoing warranties and promises to the 
Plaintiffs that survived the closing on the sale of the home for at least two years? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law, reviewed for correctness. Grayson 
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Gardner v. Maden. 
949 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah App. 1997). However, this Court may affirm the trial court's 
judgment on any available grounds. DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
3. Was the trial court correct in following undisturbed Utah precedent 
holding that an abrogation clause in a real estate purchase contract will not 
preclude the recovery of attorneys fees when Defendants breach covenants that by 
their own terms survive closing? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, 2000 UT App 121 f 13, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18; Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); 
Gardner v. Maden. 949 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah App. 1997). However, this Court may 
affirm the trial court's judgment on any available grounds. DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 
428,444 (Utah 1995). 
4. Was the trial court within its broad discretion in awarding $48,567 in 
attorneys fees? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed for patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998); City Consumer 
Services Inc. v. Peters. 815 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 1991). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the jury, and of the trial court, in every 
respect. The jury had ample evidence to find that the Defendants breached their 
respective agreements and duties to the Plaintiffs. The trial court was correct in holding 
that the doctrine of caveat emptor did not excuse the Defendants from performing the 
promises they made to the Morrises. And the trial court was correct in holding that the 
attorneys fee clause of the real estate purchase contract survived closing along with the 
affirmative covenants that the Defendants made, and breached, by failing to properly 
finish and warrant the home for which the Morrises paid over $400,000. 
The central event of this case is the purchase of a new, unfinished home in Alpine, 
Utah (the "Home") by Plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris ("Morrises") from 
Defendants Dan and Cynthia Parkinson ("Parkinsons") for $408,000. Included in the 
contract for sale of the Home were a number of express warranties that by their term 
extended beyond the closing date of the sale for a period of two years. The Morrises' real 
estate agent for the purchase was Defendant Guy Hatch ("Hatch"), who at the same time 
he was under a duty to act for the benefit of the Morrises was also the designer and 
builder of the Home, a partner with the record owners of the Home, and was the person 
responsible for finishing the Home after the Morrises bought it. In conjunction with the 
purchase of the Home, Plaintiff John Covey paid $25,000 to Defendant Linda Hatch to 
perform certain acts, primarily involving the interior of the Home, to finish and complete 
the Home. Thus Parkinsons owed duties to Morrises as sellers and warrantors. Hatch 
owed duties to Morrises as their real estate agent. And Linda Hatch owed duties to John 
Covey as a decorator. 
At trial Morrises showed, and the Parkinsons' evidence conceded that there were a 
number of defects in the Home that needed correction. The total dollar amount for such 
3 
corrections varied from approximately $15,000 (Defendant's evidence) to approximately 
$150,000 (Plaintiffs evidence). The jury determined that Parkinsons owed Morrises 
$42,220 for breach of warranty. The Parkinsons contended that because a number of 
these defects were visible to the Morrises before closing, the doctrine of caveat emptor 
excused Parkinsons from fixing the defects and finishing the Home. The trial court 
correctly ruled that because the Home was new and unfinished at the time of sale, and 
because the Parkinsons had expressly warranted the Home for a two year period 
following closing, the mere "visibility" of the defects prior to closing did not excuse the 
Parkinsons from performing their duties. 
At trial, Hatch conceded that he was the agent for the Parkinsons and disputed that 
he was the real estate agent for the Morrises. The jury disbelieved him. The real estate 
purchase agreement identified him as the Morrises' agent, and the testimony from the 
Morrises was unequivocal that Hatch acted as their agent. Hatch conceded he never 
disclosed to the Morrises that he was a joint venturer with the Parkinsons and thus a 
principal with the owner. Hatch conceded he never provided Morrises with the proper 
disclosures concerning his dual agency relationship. As a result of these self serving 
breaches, the jury determined according to Utah statute and agency regulations that Hatch 
should forfeit to the Morrises the $9,792 commission Hatch collected. The jury correctly 
arrived at the precise amount of Hatch's commission. 
At trial, the jury correctly concluded that there were a number of items Linda 
Hatch agreed with John Covey to provide to the Home, and which she failed to provide. 
The jury valued those items at $5,000. 
Finally, the trial court correctly held that because the Parkinsons entered into 
covenants and warranties that by their terms survived closing, the attorneys fees clause of 
the real estate purchase contract survived closing along with those covenants, and entitled 
the Morrises to an award of attorneys fees as a result of the Parkinsons' breaches. 
4 
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Morrises brought suit on July 23, 1997. R. 5. Defendants were represented 
initially by Anderson & Karrenberg. R. 16. More than a year later, on October 14, 1998 
Anderson & Karrenberg withdrew, and Defendants' current counsel, Hill, Harrison, 
Johnson & Schmutz then entered their appearance. R. 68. Trial of this matter 
commenced on January 20, 1999. After four days of trial, the jury returned its verdict of 
$57,012 on January 26, 1999. 
The Defendants raised their claim of caveat emptor on at least four occasions. 
Prior to trial, they raised it in the guise of a motion for partial summary judgment and by 
way of a motion in limine. R. 140, 224. Those motions were fully briefed, and denied by 
the trial court. Next, the Defendants raised the issue by trying to inject the defense into 
proposed jury instructions. The trial court rejected those instructions. Finally, 
Defendants raised the claim again in post trial motions, which were denied. 
In post trial motions, Parkinsons argued against Morrises' motion for attorneys 
fees. At the April 6, 1999 hearing, arguing against the application of this Court's ruling 
in Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996) (cert, denied 919 P.2d 1208), 
Parkinsons' attorney characterized this Court's statement of law therein as "absurd." 
April 6, 1999 Hearing Transcript at p. 12.l 
After this Court granted Morrises' motion for attorneys fees on July 14, 1999, R. 
653, Judgment was entered on August 8, 1999. R. 670. Hatch filed a post-trial motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming there was insufficient evidence of his 
precise percentage of the $12,240 real estate commission earned in the sale of the Home. 
R. 681-99. The exchange at trial was as follows: 
1
 Plaintiffs have filed concurrently herewith a motion under Rule 11(h) Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to Modify the Record to include transcripts of two hearings, April 6, 
1999 and October 28, 1999. 
5 
Q. By ilie wa>. (lie $12,240 that was paid to Pine Valley, what percentage of 
that did you get9 
A. I •• " ' .M. I haven't revie^-ei' ihe e^corcK ^ .; i Uxink we are on an 
80/20 split 
Q. So it is likely you got 80 percent ot int /• >.*.*-,.> i i . L A. It could have been less. I don't recall. 
Q. But you did get that? 
A. I did. 
Q. All right. 
A. Correct. 
R 9SS [in Ml 
At the October 28, 1999 hearing on Hatch s motion foi judgment iu; ..: .-, . \. , 
the verdict on this issue, Morrises' counsel pointed out that in Hatch's deposition, n-. had 
volunteered tl le fact tl lat 1 le \ < ras on an 80 20 split \ < ; ith his bi okei , • . . A , 
prepared to impeach liii n w Itl i that testimonj at ti ial October 2 x 
Transcript at pp. 10 11. Tlie trial court recalled this as he addressed Hatch >  counsel. 
I do have a recollection of [Mr. Match's] testimony, and as I recau - 1 also 
recall that [Mr. Hatch] was less than truthful on a number of issues, and that 
Mr. Morris caught him being less than truthful on a number of issues. But 
on this occasion [Mr. Hatch] was trying to duck the question by saying, "I 
don't recall." Mr. Morris then prepared to go ahead and see if he was going 
to have to impeach him or tie him down. As he went through it he tied him 
down so he didn't have to impeach him. 
[Mr. Hatch 
testimony, and so 
get that?" And [M 
was sitting there 'knowing that this was his deposition 
Mr. Morris] came back around and said, "But you did 
T. Hatch] said, "I did." And, "All right, so you got that 
money?" "Correct." [Mr. Hatch] decided he better fess up. 
Ortobcr 28, 1999 Hearing Transcript, pp. 18-19, i IK; trial court denied Defendants' post 
In J motions mill DelcndanL appealed on Nu\ ember 29, 1999, K, 91 j , 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
'The only factual issues on appe tl a- '*>** r<mv trom \anoih evidentiary 
minims din nil "»"i IIK Iii I f t ' tnidi i i i f H I I ' 'il 
motion^. *t c\ •' Defendants failed io marshal am. *• \ at-^ iK all oi the c\ -. \ -ice m mvor 
of the - - lu • ,, \ - miiiu tins Couii iu evaluate the trravitv of any errors that 
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may lie in the trial court's various evidentiary rulings. Rule 11(e)(2) Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and common law required this. This failure to marshal the evidence 
in favor of the jury's verdict is fatal to Defendants' appeal on these fact issues. Utah 
Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcv. 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998). 
Although not required to do so, under Rule 11(e)(2), Plaintiffs set forth here 
record evidence supporting the jury's factual findings that Parkinsons breached their 
warranties to the Morrises, that Hatch breached his duties to the Morrises as their real 
estate agent, and that Linda Hatch breached her contractual duties to John Covey. 
A. Hatch and His Joint Venturers, Parkinsons, Shortchanged the 
Home in Construction, 
Before the Morrises ever saw the Home, it was doomed. When Hatch applied for 
a building permit, he informed the City of Alpine that he was the owner of the Home. R. 
956, p. 270. Hatch was a joint venture partner on the Home with the Parkinsons. R. 955, 
p. 239-40. Yet he denied under oath at trial that he had any ownership interest in the 
Home. Id. p. 239. When Hatch went to get a loan to build the Home, he provided the 
bank with building specifications he never intended to follow. Id. p. 260. Although the 
bank appraiser based his appraisal on Hatch's specifications showing a house with 5272 
square feet in it, Hatch built the Home to have only 4300 square feet in it. Id. p. 302, Ex. 
50. The plans Hatch gave to the bank called out radiant heating. R. at Ex. 50, 956, p. 
265. But the cost of radiant heating could be as much as three times the amount of forced 
air heating. R. 957 p. 786. Instead, and against the advice of his heating subcontractor, 
Hatch installed one furnace. Id. p. 341. The system installed by Hatch was the least 
possible expensive system. R. 957 p. 789. 
The Home never had the requisite inspections completed by Alpine Building 
Inspectors, and never had a certificate of occupancy issued on it, temporary or otherwise. 
R. 955, pp. 184, 186, 193, 203-4. Yet the stucco contractor would not have applied final 
7 
coating on the MHCUI without Hatch * .-. ^L IOK* :••! *hai a!> inspections had been tun.: 
stucco contract* ^;.-^ii\' succeeded H v:v p . 4» !>/•< , - .mn e\pen .^needed the 
stucco job was "ugly in areas" and "cracking," R 958 p 1038 
Hatch' s loan from the Bank call sd 01 it landscaping 
received money from John Covey to finish landscaping. Id. p. 26V, Hatch purchased the 
lea st expensive sprinkling plai i against the preference of the unlicensed, neighborhood 
teenager he hired to install it I ::l p 160, 162 3 I he few er, cheaper and larger sprinkler 
heads installed under Hatch's direction were too far apart to i i i adcuuate eovcnu\ 
956 pp 465 6 A gainst Stat 3 i e gi ilatioi is, nc track ? pi = 
sprinkling system, thus potential!) pei mitting contaminated * * ^ . * . • a > A i p n tc b 
culinary water systems, Id p 4 / 1 2 I latch was made aware that he \\;^ luildine thi* 
I I :)iiie iiitc a negati v e slope R 955, p 165 ! negati\ e si - ; • • 
towards the Home. Id, p. 187. 
u
 buildine '--MMV! r^ told Hat ^ >i a i ailing on the n*T>:k-* *-» -j. 
. .^, nL.^. IUS;JI\* ." . ... ^en ongoing. 1 tu- A , , , ^ , .<.;;; ... .ne 
:
 \ ; w are unsafe. aiui a>-- v * ••..:.: * i w *^«. i 4(»" * hcie are ou \ \ .olations 
ui.iuunu $>15(s r vv<;icrpiiK>iing the homes lauv ;*>unddiion. I. \ M', K /^-
The plumbing coming into the Home \\.^ in ligh! ol fne number of fixtures in the Home. 
i •.:. the pipes di i:uai v . •-. - u i (, r > • i asked to 
acknowledge this, Hatch would only characterize the plumbing installation as "unwise." 
F 958 p. 963 
Hatch spent 56% of his hardwood floor budget,, which he subcontracted to others. 
R# 958 p 95Q4 On some of the items that Hatch's construction companj did oi I the 
8 
Home, where he would be receiving income, he exceeded the budgeted amounts by 
172%, 145%, 200%, and 143%. R. 958 pp. 973-4. On interior finish, Hatch spent only 
46% of the budgeted amount. Id. p. 975-6. From bank loan proceeds, Hatch and his wife 
took a $31,700 fee for "working" on the Home. Id. p. 999. 
In sum, Hatch built a smaller house than he told the bank he was going to build. 
Hatch stole money from the Home by building it as cheaply as he could. Even in cases 
where his own company was doing the work and he greatly exceeded budget, the money 
went to him, and not the Home. The overall workmanship in the Home was "very poor". 
R. 956 p. 409. The quality of the finish work on the interior, left in the condition it was 
in when Morrises purchased the home, was "poor to terrible." Id. p. 423. Interior 
framing was "very poorly done." Id. p. 423-4. The workmanship on the Home was "as 
poor a workmanship as [Morrises' damages expert] had seen in a construction project of 
any type." R. 957 p. 546. As to habitability, the Home lacked adequate safety and 
comfort. Id. pp. 546-7. 
B. The Morrises Bought The Home New and Unfinished, And Required A 
Warranty. 
On the Morrises5 first visit to the Home, Hatch told them it was not finished but 
that he would be willing to finish the Home. R. 955, p. 64. The fact that Hatch and his 
family were living in the Home at the time did not mean it was finished or used. Moving 
his family into unfinished and uninspected homes he was in the process of building was 
something Hatch did on other occasions. Id. p. 235. Among things still not finished at 
the time, and in addition to those items covered by an agreement between John Covey 
and Linda Hatch, were the window casings, Id. p. 66, circular stairway railing Id. p. 65, 
and landscaping, Ex. 1, R. 955 p. 76. Hatch told the Morrises one furnace was enough 
to heat the entire home. Id. p. 68. 
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* io<>5 *' - \ f - » r M^- entered into an agreement ; s purcha^i tin- Home 
{ Agreemen; ... . . .g.;. .^ ** 
' -ases \*ar*-* - '^. i< .•: '.^i ' - ;• • !'*' • mu because iuev ;a»: nought M<-h 
1 because at the time of purchase the- e r n ^ ^ H a 
i oer of itetik* •.. Miv. Hohit «... - e r e not timsnec ^ werp < : » . i 
76-77, irrantv COM Ted quality, workmanship. hahitahiiiu and systems .•* all 
ll
* i' M.W. n . \gi< i^ niuanicd an attorney > ice Uau>c pio* kuiig f<>
 s 
prcvai- ^ pa T * " :>rh'v-> \> oi<M be entitle^ t-- ^  reasonable attornevs fee I-A 
C. Elizabeth Morris Negotiated and Knew :;., tfreache: ... ,«i - ) 
Covey Contract, 
promised • • ^ : ^ u ^ V n C t<" ^ ^ ( » i i ! ' i l - ^ 
periorm a nutn.ai ui S U V L I S relating to decoration ..,„; ,„,. . . .raping ai uu . . 1-
\'uc terms of the Covev Contract were known mosiK to, and negotiated hv Hhzabeth 
. \ " i i e i , 
i ne icai negotiation of thi& agiociiienl \\a* u iwu-n i latch and hh/aoeth * •:*n *. 
^h/abetf' * ; srr'^ " ** * fcn*nr L*'**u ^h;i: the premises and failure of ••. .h promises 
were. 
^ ape the backyard, paini the mtenoi and finish the oak i:m rs t*\ ... K *>5:> p. h. 
D. Hatch was M o r r i s e s ' Real KSIHIC Aj>nil iiiiiiiiiiii ill Breached His Duties of 
Disclosure to the Morrises. 
I latch was the Morrises ' real estate agent on their purchase of the Home. Ex.. 1, R. 
955 p 75 Iri spite of the fact that the Parkinsons were 'willing to sell the HoTie for 
$410,000, Hatch breached his duties and told tl le Morrises that the I Lome con:.: «-. t sell 
for less than $435,000. R. 956 p. 288. He told the Morrises his being theii aizcni -> on ill i 
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that the Morrises did not have someone other than Hatch as their agent. R. 956 p. 284. 
Pine Valley Realty, Hatch's realty company, received a commission of $12,240 from the 
sale of the Home. Id. p. 178, Ex. 4. Hatch received 80% of the commission, or $9,792. 
Id. p. 241. Hatch never disclosed that he was a principal with the owner, and never 
provided the disclosures made necessary by his dual agency relationship with both buyers 
and sellers. Ex. 1. These failures violated his duties as the Morrises' real estate agent. 
R. 956 pp. 313-4,318-9. 
E. After Closing, Linda Hatch, Hatch and Parkinsons Effectively Ignored 
Morrises' Demands For Completion, and for Warranty Work That 
Became Evident and Necessary. 
Soon after closing, the weather turned and the Morrises noticed that the window 
casings permitted cold air to come into the Home. R. 955 p. 80. It was within 3-5 weeks 
of closing. R. 957 p. 641. When Hatch finally agreed to install a second furnace in the 
Home, the thermostat for that furnace was left hanging on a wire in the mechanical room. 
Ex. 41 ZZ, R. 955 p. 84. The system can't work with a thermostat in that location. R. 
956 p. 351. And even with the second furnace, the home remains improperly heated, 
because of Hatch's failure to properly locate return air vents in the home. R. 955, p. 91, 
956 p. 352-3. 
Patching and repainting the walls was never completed. R. 955 p. 88. The railing 
for the circular stairway was installed just prior to trial, and remains a code violation in 
spite of the Alpine Building Inspector's instructions to Hatch to install it correctly. Id., 
R. 955 pp. 190, 199, R. 956 pp. 407-8. The window casings were never finished, and 
daylight was visible through them. R. 955 pp. 88-9, Exs. 41B, W, X, Y, Z, and AA. 
Base trim was never installed in the kitchen. R. 955 p. 91. The spacing in the backyard 
sprinkling system is inadequate. R. 955 p. 92. Hatch saw mud and water in the Home's 
basement. Id. p. 895. Flooding in the basement caused carpet damage that Hatch never 
11 
repaired. R. 955 p. 136 I latch conceded the fact of constant fl.oodi.ng by leaving with 
tl i,€ !\ Ionises a < \ et 'drj fit their 
frames. Id. 956 p 398-9. 
Parkinsons received the demands from... the Morrises to complete the Home and do 
p. .21.6. Hatch refused to give to the Morrises Parkinsons phone number when Morrises 
desired to contact them, regarding warranty work R 957 p 643. Parkinsons relied on 
conceded Parkinsons made him responsible for fixing ihc warranty problems K ^ ^ p. 
(•^  h i • voncedcM at trial thes, .- ; : oi the
 rK,hiems identn;cc * , .-^ \. u *ibes 
i *'» ihi-n Mnands \U!c 1iu.' * l)56 p. 2SS Vv-iilr Hatch mil.ah* -en: k.iv\ 
person Match -.•* i '.» won jf jsr iiun^ act >\ list of 20 things LH U\ m complete and 
'v * o?ih '*• of them. Id. p. * - »»<^  -/^necM^ t^ trial that all oi thp p?<>i» ,-. * 
$15,000 to fix R 956 p. 288, 958 p. 969. 
F. Morrises Suffered Tents :)1IE rhousands of Dollars In Damages. 
cost $8,000 R 956 p 355 Repairing the air conditioning system "vv ill cost $1,300 Id. p. 
359, Installing a proper sprinkling system, in the Home's backyard will cost $3,300 This 
Jinn • i 
reiju-ieo to fix <.j. pfuhiem.s vviiu tin i\iuim > nc nunic, tAUUM\e of IdhOscapmg, \*> 
$95,150. Id. p. 495. 
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Fixing the 16 interior doors to fit within their frames will cost $14,000. Id. p. 501. 
Repainting the interior and finishing the oak floor will cost $9,815 and $8,111, 
respectively. R. 957 p. 534-5. The total cost to correct the construction deficiencies on 
the inside is $50,774. R. 957 p. 550. All of the foregoing are costs of remediation. If 
Hatch had built the Home as he should have, it would have cost him only an additional 
$11-14,000 to correctly do the exterior and an additional $1,600-1,700 to correctly do the 
interior. Id. p. 541, 545-6. Instead, those monies went elsewhere. 
G. Morrises' Attorney Agreed to Not Charge Them, but Reserved the 
Right to Seek Fees from Parkinsons, 
Morrises' counsel agreed to represent the Morrises without charging them, but 
requiring reimbursement of costs and reserving the right to pursue fees if the Morrises 
prevailed against the Parkinsons. R. 397, 488, 512, 552. Also, Parkinsons' lawyers 
billed over $27,000 for the month of January, 1999, alone. R. 445. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the jury, and of the trial court, in every 
respect. As to all factual matters, Defendants' failure to marshal evidence precludes 
review by this Court of the trial court's denial of post-trial motions, and precludes fair 
consideration of the various evidentiary rulings about which Defendants complain. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's rulings on the legal issues. The trial 
court followed this Court's undisturbed precedents in ruling that the doctrine of caveat 
emptor has no application where the buyer is purchasing a new home, and where the 
buyer has express agreements with the seller to complete, alter, fix, or modify aspects of 
the home. 
The trial court also followed undisturbed precedent from this Court in ruling that 
the doctrine of merger, embodied in the Agreement's abrogation clause, does not 
preclude enforcement of agreements collateral to conveying title. Similarly, attorneys 
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fees provisions survive with those covenants and apply when a breach of surviving 
co ' enants is established, as it w as hei e 
Finally, this Court should affirm the trial court's fee award, based as it was on a 
very detailed and thorough consideration MI'a]J elements relevant to what a reasonable 
allmiieys fee in llms case wnii. Il I (hen icnidikl llns case lo llic liiitll u nil 
for a determination of attorneys fees and costs on appeal 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO 
THEIR CLAIMS OF EVIDENTIARY ERRORS BY THE TRIAL CO! JRT 
and should affirm, the jury's findings of breach and damages against the Defendants. 
Rules 50(b) and 59(a)(6) I Jtah R ules of Civil Procedun provide »-• e^encr that 
Defendants maj obtain a ji ldgment in til leii fai • 01 , not i itl is »t 
them, or they may obtain a new trial, respectively, if the • *- inadequate i-videnio to 
support the ji 11 ] verdict In post trial motions Defend::**? •• challeng 'be 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jui > ' 's findi *c , , ; la, KJ nsons ov^ ,. ie 
Morrises $42,220 for breach of the real estate purchase agreement's warranties. 
A. Den.) lug Post ' I i ial Motions m as 1 '"i opei 
In weighing the adequacy of the ev idence on other issues, this court must vie\ \ all 
evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to 
1
 • —< -. Mas Uiu Market - s 
i: s • » . a- t . Defendants' !-v .^ u* naisnai the t> viueike pieciudes this v oun [ uni 
properly evaluating the trial court's denial of post trial motions A nd because there is 
and that Guy I latch owes the Morrises his real estate commission of $9,792, this I ourt 
1 1 
should affirm the trial court's denial of Defendants' post trial motions that were based on 
the evidence. 
B. Evidence At Trial Supports The Jury In AH Respects. 
As to Defendants' claims that there were various evidentiary rulings by the trial 
court that should give rise to a reversal of the jury verdict, again Defendants' failure to 
marshal the evidence precludes this Court from fairly or effectively determining the 
substance, materiality, and "harm" of any such errors. 
The evidence shows, without the benefit of reasonable inferences, that Elizabeth 
Morris and Guy Hatch were the real negotiators and parties to the Covey Contract. 
Elizabeth Morris testified that the "decorate per plan" portion of the agreement called for, 
among other things, refinishing the wood floors and repainting the interior. The Covey 
Contract also expressly called out the installation of sod and sprinkling in the Home's 
backyard. Mr. Hatch installed a cheap system against the recommendation of his 
installer, and even Defendants' own expert acknowledged the deficiency of the system. 
Evidence from Plaintiffs' experts showed damages on the landscaping of at least 
$3,300, without the cost of new sod, $8,111 for refinishing the wood floors, and $9,815 
for patching walls and repainting the interior. This total evidence of at least $21,226 
damages under the Covey Contract supports the jury verdict against Linda Hatch for 
$5,000. 
Hatch complains that the amount of the commission that he received was not 
within the recollection of his broker at trial, and thus the jury should not have awarded 
the sum of $9,792.00 against him. However, Hatch did testify that his agreement with his 
broker was that he was to receive eighty percent of the total commission, which 
commission was three percent of the sales price. Thus, it was a simple matter of 
mathematics for the jury to deduce that Hatch received a commission of .024 percent 
(80% X 3%) of the original purchase price of $408,000. The math on that equation 
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equals the precise dollar amount of $9 ,792.00 awarded by the jury . The j u ry ' s simple 
iiiathenicilical i JIIIII uLtlniii i iililii ml the ': - ]\ "!i I latcl it 
implies is necessary to support the \ er ^ : supposed l>v record evidence Thus,,, this 
Court should affirm the j u r y ' s award of $9,792 against Hatch. 
I he l ads aluiri, i show lliall lilt fin \ llliiitl ample !«iiotiiiiii . In liml lln I inn caches •! (In 
statutory, ethical and contractual duties they found, and to find the Morrises suffered 
damages. For these reasons, this Coi irt slioi ild affirm the jur \ * judgment 
notwithstanding any errors there might have been, I: I it vv hich errors vus. .evertheless 
harmless. Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
n . I HE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE DOCTRINE OF 
CAVEAT EMPTOR IS NEITHER AVAILABLE WITH A NEW HOME 
SALE, NOR MAY IT TRUMP EXPRESS WARRANTIES. 
Parkinsons do not seriously contest the breaches of their warranties only the 
air^nnt But thc\ <2<* • -v '••' !aim that caveat emptor precludes a miii'M <>* ~ V*. crises' 
IIK newness ot the Home and uie I'ai^msoiis express wanunii' ^,\«ude 
Parkinson- tr • *•-<•!• nlraUual obl.L'.r *1-* -in:' . , 'w<-A'~ ' cuveut 
emptor Vd^kiitb^^n^ complain thai because a n u ^ K M^bierns \\\\i\ ti ^ lome were 
apparent when the Morrises \- *: ri.i t lx Home, the Morrises should ix . .irreii irorn 
cc n lplaining aboi it them A ccepting thi
 r • •. - *, • : .»• «*, 
rh i s Court should reject the d e f e n d a n t U J U I - .*iat tin *k w-c\.* m the * -mc. wmch 
the Morrises proved to be breaches of the express warranties set forth in the Agreement, 
i s 
i t*uu, Utah State Medical Assoc, v. Liu- MOU, (>;o l\,c r43 
(Utah 1982), apparently applies only to "i ised" property, Oth^r. more rceep* deacons 
fi : 'ii l t! lis Coi u t and from till le I Jtal I Si lpi eme Coi n It si ic .. i 
application in this case. The Morrises were free to contract with the Parkinsons for the 
purpose of securing proper completion of the Home, and that such completion would be 
warranted for a period of two years following the purchase of the Home. 
In Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), this Court considered the 
claims of purchasers of a home for alleged design and construction defects. There, this 
Court expressly noted limitations on application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in Utah. 
One exception is that the doctrine "has eroded in the sale of new residential housing." Id. 
at 1389. Also, the Supreme Court of Utah has held caveat emptor applies only in the 
absence of an express agreement. 
[I]n the absence of express agreement or misrepresentation, 
the purchaser is expected to make his own examination and 
draw his own conclusions as to the condition of the land 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 1987) (emphasis by Court) 
(citation omitted). Here, the Parkinsons concede, as they must, that an express agreement 
creating a two year warranty period for quality, workmanship, habitability, and systems 
of all kinds was in place and survived closing on the purchase of the Home. This express 
agreement relieved the Morrises from the burden of living with problems visible to them 
at the time of contract. 
For the reasons that the Home was new at the time it was purchased, and because 
there exists an express agreement between the sellers and purchasers of the home, the 
doctrine of caveat emptor never had any application in this case. Thus, this Court should 
affirm the judgment of the jury, and affirm the trial court's repeated rejection of that 
defense. 
III. PARKINSONS OWE MORRISES ATTORNEYS FEES. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that as a matter of law, Parkinsons 
are liable to the Morrises for a reasonable attorneys fee. The Parkinsons acknowledged 
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they breached their warranties to the Morrises, the jury found that the damages from the 
breach amounted to $42,220, and the Agreement provides for fees to the prevailing party. 
Finally, this Court should also affirm the judgment of the trial court which found, in its 
broad discretion, that a reasonable attorneys fee was $48,567. 
A. The Merger Doctrine, And Thus the Abrogation Clause Does Not 
Apply To The Agreement. 
Recently, this Court verified that the doctrine of merger, and a contract's 
abrogation clause, will not preclude an attorneys fee award if the prevailing party 
establishes a default under the terms of the contract. 
1. The trial court correctly followed this Court in awarding fees. 
The trial court based its attorneys fee award on this Court's decision in Mavnard v. 
Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996) (cert, denied 919 P.2d 1208). There, this Court 
noted that the abrogation clause in an earnest money agreement is "a contractual 
statement of the merger doctrine." Id. at 451. While Parkinsons' attorney characterized 
this as "absurd," the Utah Supreme Court saw fit to deny certiorari. 
In Mavnard, this Court set forth four exceptions to the merger doctrine, including 
the "existence of rights collateral to the contract of sale." Id. At 450. In denying the 
claim for attorneys fees in that case, this Court set forth its reasoning. 
The sellers did not point to any express warranties, 
covenants, or agreements on which buyers defaulted. . . . In 
short, paragraph "N" does not contemplate an award of 
attorney fees for sellers just because buyers sued. 
In sum, attorney fees may be awarded under the instant 
contract only when one party can show that the other party 
has defaulted on an explicit covenant or agreement contained 
in the earnest money agreement. 
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Id. at 452. In other words, this Court recognized that the attorneys fee clause attaches to 
every covenant of an earnest money agreement, and arises with every breach. And if a 
covenant survives closing by its own terms, the attorneys fee clause survives with it. 
In contrast to the fact pattern in Maynard, Parkinsons' breach of their post closing 
warranties to the Morrises is precisely the situation this Court in Mavnard declared as 
appropriate for an award of attorneys fees. Here, Parkinsons must concede now, as Hatch 
conceded on their behalf, that they breached the express warranties contained in the 
Agreement, and that such warranties were collateral to conveying title . . . extending two 
years beyond closing. Consequently, Parkinsons' obligation to pay a reasonable 
attorneys fee for their breach of post-closing agreements survived closing, and remains an 
enforceable obligation. 
2. Parkinsons' cases support the trial court's fee award, 
Parkinsons rely on the 1966 decision of Kelsey v. Hansen, 419 P.2d 198 (Utah 
1966) for the proposition that an earnest money agreement's abrogation clause will 
eviscerate collateral agreements. There, however, the collateral agreement at issue was 
"preliminary, loosely drawn and almost incoherent." Id. at 198. It was unknown whether 
the promise was to be performed before or after closing. Contrast that here to express 
warranties that Parkinsons concede are unambiguous, that extend beyond closing for a 
period of two years, and which Parkinsons concede they breached. Further, Parkinsons 
failed to point out that the holding in Kelsey was distinguished, and impliedly limited, by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168, 170 n.4 (Utah 1977). 
Defendants also cited this court to the case of Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance 
Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that under the merger doctrine, all 
clauses of a sale contract are merged into the final deed at closing, and thus there are no 
attorneys fees awardable under the Agreement. The Espinoza case has no application 
here because the Parkinson contract promised more than a simple conveyance of title. In 
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Espinoza. the plaintiffs sought recovery against a title insurer because of a defect in title, 
and against the grantors for the same breach. In refusing to award attorneys fees, the 
court there stated that the contract providing for fees was extinguished at closing. Id. at 
348. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the importance of suing on a title claim, 
versus suing on a claim collateral to conveying title. In Stubbs v. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that when a real property sales contract 
contains agreements that are collateral to conveyance of title, those obligations survive 
closing. 
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recognizes, is 
applicable when the acts to be performed by the seller in a 
contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer. . . . 
However, if the original contract calls for performance 
by the seller of some act collateral to conveyance of title, his 
obligations with respect thereto survive the deed and are not 
extinguished by it. . . . When seller's performance is intended 
by the parties to take place at some time after the delivery of 
the deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated by the 
parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full 
performance on the part of the seller, absent some manifest 
intent to the contrary. 
Id. at 169-170 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
There are no title defects in this case. Defendants' reliance on the merger doctrine 
and upon the Agreement's abrogation clause is misplaced for the reason that the 
Agreement expressly provided for covenants that were collateral to the conveyance of 
title. It was those collateral covenants that the Parkinsons breached. 
Thus, because paying attorneys fees as a result of breaching collateral agreements 
is, itself, collateral to conveying title, the attorneys fee clause survived closing with those 
breached covenants. Here, the jury found that the Parkinsons breached the two-year 
warranty of workmanship, quality, habitability, and systems of all kinds. Both the 
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duration and character of these warranties expressly make them collateral to the 
conveyance, and thus the Agreement was not merged in the final deed. It also bears 
noting that in Stubbs, the court affirmed the attorneys fee award of the trial court. Id. at 
171. Because the trial court correctly followed the law set forth in Stubbs and Maynard. 
this Court should affirm Parkinsons' liability for attorneys fees. 
B. Parkinsons Are Obligated To Pay A Reasonable Attorneys Fee. 
Parkinsons next claim that because the Morrises' attorney agreed to perform his 
services without requiring payment from them, the Parkinsons have no liability. This is 
wrong as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court's implicit acknowledgment that fees 
may be awardable even in a contingent fee case moots any claim by Defendants that the 
Morrises' fee agreement with their counsel precludes a recovery. "Whether the attorneys 
provided their services pro bono, at a discount, or at full market rate does not affect a 
determination of reasonable attorney's fees, (citations omitted)." Barker v. Utah Public 
Srv. Comm.. 970 P.2d 702, 711 (Utah 1998). The Supreme Court of Utah made this 
statement expressly in response to the idea that the attorneys "did not really expect to 
receive payment." Id. 
To hold that the Morrises must legally owe their attorneys fees, or pay them before 
they are entitled to the attorneys fee award called out in the Agreement would give rise to 
innumerable questions, and attacks, from which trial courts could never extricate a clear 
rationale for ruling. For example, what if the attorney agrees to reduce his charges as 
between him and his clients? What if the clients file bankruptcy to avoid paying their 
attorney? What if the clients go on a years long payment plan to satisfy their obligations 
to their attorney? The variations are limitless. 
But here, the Agreement could not be more simply and clearly worded. "In any 
action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
21 
reasonable attorney's fees." Ex. 1. There is nothing in this language which requires 
either that the Morrises be legally obligated to pay their attorney any money, or that they 
actually pay fees to their attorney. Simply, the Agreement conditioned the Parkinsons' 
liability on none of the above variations . . . only that the Morrises prevail on their claims 
arising from the Agreement. That condition is satisfied here, and this Court should affirm 
the trial court. 
C. The Fees Awarded Are Reasonable. 
The trial court issued a seven page ruling on July 14, 1999, in which it fully 
considered all of the requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court and Rule 1.5 of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct before awarding Morrises a reasonable attorneys 
fee of $48,567. This Court should affirm the amount of the trial court's fee award 
because Parkinsons have failed to show patent error or a clear abuse of discretion in the 
award. Instead, Parkinsons claim the award is unreasonable because the jury verdict 
allegedly exceeded an offer of judgment by only $12,000, and because Defendants 
allegedly only incurred $27,806 in fees defending against all claims. Both of these 
claims are insupportable. 
It is true the Parkinsons' offered to accept judgment for $30,000. But judgment 
exceeded this amount by over $80,000, not the $12,000 claimed by Parkinsons. There 
was no attribution in Parkinsons' offer among the claims in the Complaint, or for 
attorneys fees. The only reasonable inference is that Parkinsons hoped to settle aU claims 
with the $30,000. Because the total amount of the judgment on all claims exceeded 
$110,000, Parkinsons' offer of nearly a quarter of this amount does not suggest patent 
error or a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in the amount of fees awarded, in 
particular when the Parkinsons conceded they were in breach. 
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Secondly, the Parkinsons' claim that they only spent $27,000 on all fees is belied 
by their counsel's affidavit. Defendants' current law firm, Hill, Harrison, Johnson & 
Schmutz, apparently billed the Defendants the amount of $27,806.00 just for the month 
of January, 1999, when trial was held. Parkinsons conveniently failed to mention that 
they had employed the firm of Anderson & Karrenberg at the beginning of the suit, which 
then withdrew after the case had been litigated, and had been pending for over a year. 
Further, there is no mention of the amount of fees incurred by Parkinsons' attorneys for 
all months, from July, 1997 through the end of 1998, before they incurred the $27,000 
during the month of trial in January, 1999. Here, too, Parkinsons cannot show patent 
error or clear abuse of discretion, and this Court should affirm the amount of the trial 
court's award. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to affirm the 
jury's and trial court's rulings in every respect, and to remand this case to the trial court 
for determination of a reasonable attorneys fee and costs incurred on appeal, pursuant to 
Rule 34 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Respectfully Submitted this TV* day of July, 2000. 
SNELL & WILMER/, L.L.P. 
Mark O. Morris 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby declare that on this ^ day of July, 2000, I caused to be mailed 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to: 
Stephen Quesenberry, Esq. 
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